Intimate Time
Just look at the future, and just imagine, when is somebody still alive that you will love?
Lately, Andri Snær Magnason has been asking people this question. He really wants us to calculate this. For instance, I am about to turn 34 this weekend (9/19/20). I don't have any children, but I do have little cousins whom I love.
What will the world be like in 2146?
There are some fascinating data visualization tools out there that you can use to explore climate projections (estimates of the future value of climate variables under various possible approaches to mitigation and adaptation). Check out e.g. Climate Inspector (info here). For my city (Troy, NY), on a high emissions scenario, the mean annual global temperature averaged over 2080-2099 is expected to be 10.8 degrees F or 6 degrees C higher than the reference temperature, which in this case is the mean global temperature averaged over 1986-2005. On a low emissions scenario, its 3.5 degrees F or 1.9 degrees C.
From what I gather, a world warmed by 6 degrees C is virtually a hellscape.
Do we have duties to protect future people from adverse effects of climate change? Why? Who is "we"?
As I am thinking about these questions now, it strikes me that maybe these are the wrong questions to be asking. Rather than asking about moral duties that we have with respect to future people, maybe, as Andri Snær Magnason suggests, we should be reflecting on our hopes for people that we love. I don't want Juliet to die of climate change induced heatstroke, dehydration, or human conflict. I hope that she can live to be an old lady who can pass away plausibly believing that future generations can flourish. Whatever moral duties I have with respect to future people, I am also compelled by my own real love of my sweet cousin to do what I can to ensure her life does not end in extreme global suffering.
In "Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change" Simon Caney argues for what he calls a "hybrid account" of duties with respect to adverse climate impacts (2005, 769). Caney frames the hybrid account as a response to some problems that sees with the so-called "polluter pays principle" (PPP) approach to climate-related duties. In particular, Caney argues the PPP is not well-equipped to account for greenhouse gas emissions caused by (i) persons who are now deceased, (ii) those emitters who were excusably ignorant at the time of the contribution to harmful effects that they were making, and (iii) those who refuse to act on their climate-related duties. On the PPP approach, Caney claims, the actions that these three classes of agents are responsible for fail to be performed, with potentially devastating consequences. In contrast, Caney endorses the following four duties, which incorporate the motivation of the PPP but also build upon it (2005, 769):
(D1) All are under a duty not to emit greenhouse gases in excess of their quota.
(D2) Those who exceed their quota (and/or have exceeded it since 1990) have a duty to compensate others (through mitigation or adaptation) (a revised version of the ‘polluter pays’ principle).
(D3) In the light of (i), (ii), and (iii) the most advantaged have a duty either to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in proportion to the harm resulting from (i), (ii), and (iii) (mitigation) or to address the ill-effects of climate change resulting from (i), (ii), and (iii) (adaptation) (an ability to pay principle).
(D4) In the light of (iii) the most advantaged have a duty to construct institutions that discourage future non-compliance (an ability to pay principle).
Caney refers to the year 1990 in D2 as a plausible date beyond which the general public could not be judged as "excusably ignorant" of the harmful effects of greenhouse gas emissions--by that point, the science was certainly clear enough. In practice, Caney's approach implies that the most wealthy should foot the bill to make up for the duties that were left unaccounted for on the polluter-pays approach. So concretely, on Caney's view I have a duty to keep my own contribution to greenhouse gas emissions under my fair quota, to compensate others insofar as I fail to do so, and furthermore, insofar as I fall among the class of "most advantaged", to pay the compensation that impoverished polluters owe and "to construct institutions that discourage future non-compliance". (It would be interesting to explore the question of how we ought to interpret this latter clause.)
I agree with Caney that those who are knowingly contributing to the climate-induced harm of future generations via greenhouse gas emissions ought to pay, at least insofar as paying would not violate their own human rights. And insofar as there is a remainder to be paid, I agree with Caney that even if that one is not responsible directly for that remainder ("Those weren't my emissions!"), those who are relatively comfortable in the ability to pay should do so, even if this is in a sense unfair.
What if I--as one among the most advantaged--pay to the point of risking my own human rights and the total rights-risking harms of climate change are still not accounted for? Do I get to just give up at that point? What other duty could I have?
Elizabeth Cripps has argued that if the climate change mitigation and adaptation actions that I can perform as a lone individual are insufficient to address the climate problem given what others are doing (or failing to do) I still have further climate-related duties. Consider her analogy to the following hypothetical case: suppose a child is drowning offshore and you are standing on the beach with a group of others and a large rowboat. Coordinating together, you could row out and save the child. But what if the other people on the beach just stand around, uselessly pointing and wringing their hands? You might think that your "fair share" of the rescue mission would be to operate one of the oars. Unfortunately, by yourself you can't row the whole boat and save the child. Would it be right for you to just do your fair share? Cripps thinks not: "By sitting in the stationary boat pushing an oar in a rowing movement? Such a performance would be utterly meaningless, taken as an individual action" (2013, 118). Instead of half-rowing on land like a fool, Cripps thinks that in the face of the inaction of others, you incur a duty to try to bring about the collective action that would be sufficient to save the child, namely, actually rowing the boat together. With respect to climate change, an individual cannot simply live a "green lifestyle" by, say, riding a bike, powering her house with renewable energy, eating local foods etc. She might do all that perfectly and still we could be faced with a catastrophic climate problem as a collective. Cripps argues that perhaps our most important duties with respect to climate action are what she calls "promotional duties", which are "[d]uties to attempt to bring about the necessary collective action" (116).
It seems to me that Caney's D4 also speaks to this idea of promotional duties. Insofar as I am doing my fair share, perhaps even more than my fair share to protect people from harmful effects of anthropogenic climate change, I am still not fulfilling all of my relevant duties. I still need to do what I can to bring about a sufficient climate response, which may involve organizing or otherwise motivating others to act too. I have this duty not just because it would be more fair if everyone did their part, insofar as they are able, but because I personally care about the well-being of actual people like Juliet, who I hope will live to see the year 2100.
Interesting take on the article. I just have a few questions that I thought about when I was reading your post. First, how would you defend Cripp's argument to someone who says that it is simply impossible for everyone to care about climate change when there are things in their life that they view as more pressing issues, things that are more visible and immediate, how can you convince them that climate change is the thing they should be worrying about. Second how would you defend Caney's 3rd and 4th principle in the real world. By that I mean is it really plausible to get each 1st world country specifically the US, China, and India (the worlds 3 largest economies) to change the way that they manufacture goods? In other words why would China agree to spend billions maybe even trillions on recreating their infrastructure to produce goods in a "green" way?
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